Religions and Ethno-Religious Differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From Laboratories of Hate to Peaceful Reconciliation by Alicino, Francesco
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 37/2016 
21 novembre 2016                                                                                                  ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
Francesco Alicino 
(associate Professor of Comparative Public Law and Public Law and Religions 
at the University of LUM “Jean Monnet”, Faculty of Law) 
 
 
Religions and Ethno-Religious Differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
From Laboratories of Hate to Peaceful Reconciliation  
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The Politicization of Religion and the Nationalization 
of Confessions - 3. The Place of Religion and Religious Confession - 4. The Constituent 
(Chosen) People and Religious Power-Sharing Mechanism - 5. The Education System 
and Religious Education - 6. The Legal Status of Churches and the State-Religions 
Relationship - 7. Conclusion.  
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
Even though the war ended about twenty years ago, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereinafter BiH) is still struggling to find its way of 
reconstruction and reconciliation that would result in a better life for its 
citizens. After so much time, it is clear that the political and institutional 
design made up by the 1995 Dayton agreement does not work to contribute 
fully to that aim. In particular, not much has been done to improve social 
and economic well-being1.  
One of the decisive factors behind this situation is the lack of mutual 
respect between moral agencies operating within the Country. It is no 
wonder if this situation is normally reputed more as absence of war than as 
peace and reconciliation: negative peace, the absence of war is all that has 
been achieved, as divisions still persist. Moreover, this situation is at times 
sustained by a religious context that still feeds ethno-national conflicting 
positions2. Which proves the fact that, as in the past, religion is playing a 
                                                          
 The article, peer reviewed, is due to be published in Twenty Years after Dayton. The 
Constitutional Transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Proceedings of the Conference), LUISS 
University Press, Rome, 2016. 
 
1 M. KOINOVA, Conclusions: Building on Regional Trends to Develop New Mechanisms for 
Political Change, in Post-Yugoslavia New Cultural and Political Perspectives, ed. by D. Abazović 
and M. Velikonja, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014, pp. 198-203. 
2 See ex plurimis X. Bougarel, E. Helms, G. Duijzings (eds.), The New Bosnian Mosaic: 
Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 37/2016 
21 novembre 2016                                                                                                  ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
2 
 
significant role in many sectors of today’s BiH, including those referring to 
institutional and political framework.  
It would be wrong to understand the Bosnian war, the main source 
of the Country’s current problems, only in terms of a religious war: the 
tragedy in the first half of 1990s was in large part a consequence of the 
processes taking place in the second half of 1980s, such as a growing 
economic crisis and a gradual decomposition of the legitimacy of the 
socialist political system. Yet, it would also be wrong to adopt the 
explanation that religion had no role in BiH’s catastrophe. Of course, some 
dimensions of that sort cannot be neglected. But they cannot mask the 
ethnic-religious aspects of the conflict.  
As a matter of fact, the misfortunes that occurred in the region during 
the first half of 1990s was in many respects the result of the abuse of the 
people’s religious identity, relieved through myth and tradition that even 
today remain important inspirations for the future3. In this article I will first 
analyse the genesis of this situation and, in particular, the radical 
nationalism of BiH, which since the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia has been 
strictly related to the processes of politicization of religion and religious 
creeds. This will make it easier to understand the place and the role of 
religion and confession in the Country’s current legal system. For this 
purpose, it will be worth focusing the attention on concrete issues, like those 
referring to the constitutional right to freedom of religion, the principle of 
secularism, the ethnic-religious oriented tripartite structure of BiH’s 
political institutions, the education system, and the legal status of Churches 
and religious communities.  
It is undeniable that religion and religious actors contributed largely 
to the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia. For the same reasons, though, it 
is also unquestionable that, either for the better or worse, they have an 
important part to play in the existing reconstruction process. 
 
 
2 - The Politicization of Religion and the Nationalization of Confessions 
 
As is widely known, confessions were marginalized in public life 
throughout the period of socialist Yugoslavia. This brought hope to many 
that in future religion would not have given rise to significant problems in 
the Balkan region. Conversely, during the harsh reality of the war religion 
                                                          
3 V. TISMANEANU, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1998, p. 15. 
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was used as a tool in empowerment of national agendas, increasing the 
distance between the major ethnic groups4. From here two reciprocal 
processes stemmed, the politicization of religion5 and the nationalization of 
confessions6, which reduced religious creeds to mere nationalized symbols 
celebrating a God that loved and preferred one national group to other 
factions7.  
Under these approaches, the Bosnian war was preceded and 
accompanied by an aggressive propaganda campaign, based on adapting 
ancient myths and religious doctrines to current ideologies8. It is thus that 
laboratories of hate renewed ancient atrocities9. Take, for example, the 
tragedy of Muslims in Bosnia, based on the fact that they were too Muslim 
for the West and not Muslim enough for the Islamic world: they were in 
effect caught between the nationalist interests and the most distinctive thing 
about them, their religious component. Conversely, the support of the 
Muslim world to the war efforts of the Bosnian side was prominent: despite 
the embargo, Iran and other Muslim-majority Countries sent arms and 
military advisors to the Bosnians; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States 
provided financial aid; nongovernmental religious organizations and 
                                                          
4 See S. VRCAN, Proselytism, Religion and Ethnicification of Politics. A Sociological 
Analysis, in Religion in Eastern Europe, 1997, 17:5, pp. 1-20; N. ANDJELIC, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the End of a Legacy, Frank Cass, London 2003; P. MOJZES, Balkan Genocides. 
Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham 
(MD), 2011. 
5 D. ABAZOVIĆ, Reconciliation, Ethnopolitics and Religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in D. 
Abazović and M. Velikonja (eds.), Post-Yugoslavia New Cultural and Political Perspectives, pp. 
35-56. 
6 See ex plurimis M. SELLS, Serbian Religious Nationalism, Christoslavism, and the Genocide 
in Bosnia, 1992-1995, in Religion and the War in Bosnia, ed. by P. Mojzes, Scholars Press, 
Atlanta (GA), 1998, pp. 201-202. 
7 G. SHENK, God With Us? The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, Life 
and Peace Institute, Uppsala 1993; G. POWERS, Religion, Conflict and Prospects for 
Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia, in Journal of International Affairs, 1996, 50:1, 
pp. 62-67; P.H. LIOTTA, A. SIMONS, Thicker than Water? Kin, Religion, and Conflict in the 
Balkans, in PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1998, http://strategicstudi 
esinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/98winter/liotta.htm (last accessed 17 September 
2016). 
8 M. VELIKONJA, Liberation Mythology: The Role of Mythology in Fanning War in the 
Balkans,” in P. Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia, cit., p. 38; B. ANZULOVIC’, 
Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, London, 1999. 
9 M. VELIKONJA (translated from Slovenian by Rang’ichi Ng’inja), Religious 
Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Texas A&M University Press, 
College Station, 2003, p. 245. 
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institutions offered everything from humanitarian help to recruiting 
Muslim volunteers for the fighting in Bosnia10. 
Not to mention Radovan Karadzˇic, who said that forcing Serbs and 
non-Serbs to live together would be like doing the same to “cats and dogs”, 
adding that “Bosnia had never existed and it will never exist”11. In this 
perspective one may explain, without justifying, the destruction of 
historical recollection. So, it is not by chance that the initial targets of Serbs 
and other nationalists were cultural-religious monuments and that the first 
goals of their aggression in BiH were religious leaders12: fifty-four Muslim 
clergymen had been killed by mid-June, 1992, while about two hundred 
people were interned in Serbian and Croatian camps for prisoners, 
including many active imams13. 
In this manner, the return of religious-national integrationists 
produced tensions and intolerance, on the one hand, and the exclusion of 
the considerable atheistic population within each nation, on the other. The 
three main religious hierarchies in BiH were sending open or veiled appeals 
to people of their denomination to support the respective faction of their 
nation. The strongest political parties of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats tried 
to exploit the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches as a means of 
acquiring support and legitimacy. The rhetoric of other party’s leaders was 
influenced by religious references, such as Qur’anic inscriptions and biblical 
texts14.  
The major religious organizations were in other terms voluntarily 
involved in the war, even though in different ways and to different degrees. 
Some religious authorities went so far as to bless warring activities that 
resulted in persecution and killing. Others were silent about crimes 
committed in the name of their God15. To this respect, what was going on 
was a religious genocide, through which individuals were generally 
classified, and at times persecuted if not killed, on the basis of their religious 
                                                          
10 X. BOUGAREL, L’Islam bosniaque, entre identité culturelle et idéologie politique, in Le 
Nouvel Islam balqanique: Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme, 1990–2000, ed. by X. 
Bougarel, N. Clayer, Maison and Larose, Paris, 2001, pp. 103-104. 
11 M. VELIKONJA, Religious Separation, cit., p. 254. 
12 M. SELLS, Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in Bosnia–Hercegovina, 
in Sociology of Religion, 2003, 64:3, pp. 309-331. 
13 M. SELLS, Crosses of Blood, cit.. 
14 L.J COHEN, Bosnia’s Tribal Gods: The Role of Religion in Nationalistic Politics, in Religion 
and the War in Bosnia, ed. by P. Mojzes, American Academy of Religions-Scholars Press, 
Atlanta, 1998, pp. 43-69. 
15 M. BAX, Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A Case-Study from Rural 
Bosnia Hercegovina, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2000, 23:1, pp. 16-31. 
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identity16. The violence was grounded in a religious mythology, used to 
describe the targeted persons as race traitors and the extermination of 
‘others’ as a sacred act17. 
On the other hand, denial was present everywhere, which means that 
some parts of the population denied the facts, others replaced them with 
myths as counter-memory. The only thing they had in common was that 
they considered religion as a hard national-ethnic subject and confessions 
as crucial differentia specifica. This explains why political ideologies 
demanded the support of organized religious doctrines in order to 
legitimize new establishments; which implied the exploitation of religions 
for national purposes18. And, from this point of view, there was no 
significant difference between the major religious organizations; namely the 
Islamic community, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church.  
All this mirrors the fact that the collapse of socialist and Yugoslav 
State opened room for the de-privatization of religion, feeding various 
national mythical constructs embedded in the minds of the population19. 
One of these constructs referred to the ‘chosen people’ that (by chance?) 
broadly coincided with the suitability of the dominant confession for the 
nation, the demonization of other creeds, and the mythologizing of 
important religious-national figures from the past and present. In addition, 
those constructs supported visions of an imagined future infused with 
religious integrism20, which was melded almost perfectly with national 
integrism21. 
Thus, nationalists on all three sides often denounced non-integrist 
individuals as atheistic and antinational. Correspondingly, the socialist 
regime was perceived as being responsible for the outbreak of hatred and 
violence because of its desertion of the Bible-Qur’an, and because of its 
religious immorality and anti-Serb-Croat-Muslim orientation. Likewise, the 
public sites of dramatic religious events from the past became the 
                                                          
16 M. SELLS, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, University of 
California Press, Berkeley (CA), 1998. 
17 M. VELIKONJA, Religious Separation, cit., p. 260. 
18 I. CVITKOVIC, Religions in War: The Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Occasional 
Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2001, 21:6, pp. 32-45.  
19 V. PERICA, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 4-11. 
20 D. ABAZOVIĆ, Reconciliation, cit., p. 37. 
21 D. ABAZOVIĆ, Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Brill NV, Koninklijke, 2007, 7:08, pp. 
317-326. 
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destinations of national pilgrimages and rituals: Ajvatovica for the 
Bosnians, Medjugorje for the Croats, and the tombs of Ustasha victims for 
the Serbs. Religious feasts (such as the Bajram, commemoration of the Battle 
of Badr, Easter, Assumption, Christmas, St. Vitus’s Day) were also turned 
into national holidays and celebrated in public buildings.  
In sum, national divisions ended up sustaining conflicting 
differences in religious identities and viceversa.  
The result of such collective process on a largely secularized 
population soon became evident. Public opinion polls in 1988 showed that 
only 55.8% of Croats, 37.3% of Bosnians, 18.6% of Serbs and 2.3% of 
Yugoslavs declared themselves to be believers. The situation changed 
completely in 1999: 89.5% of Croats and 78.3% of Bosnians declared to be 
believers. A year later, research in the Doboj region showed that 88% of 
Croats, 84.8% of Bosnians, 81.6% of Serbs and 16.7% of those nationally 
undefined declared themselves “very religious” or “medium religious”22. 
In our time, according to the 2013 census of BiH (whose final results were 
published in June 2016)23 50.7% of BiH’s population identify religiously as 
Muslim, 30.75% as Serbian Orthodox Christian, 15.19% as Roman Catholic, 
1.15% as other, and only 1.1% as agnostic or atheist24.  
This demonstrates that, although in a less bloody way than during 
the war, within the Country the role and the place of religion and religious 
communities have continued to increase. As a matter of fact, in BiH 
religious identity still emerges as one of the most important form of 
collective conscience with the capacity to address fundamental concerns 
and existential questions, and to provide protective-collective cohesion. As 
such, it has been influencing political narratives and practices that, in turn, 
are being used to justify ethnically based constructions and institutions.  
 
 
3 - The Place of Religion and Religious Confession 
 
Religion in BiH is not confined to religious denominations or official 
leaders. It also involves local traditions, distinctive customs, peculiar value 
                                                          
22 M. VELIKONJA, Religious Separation, cit., p. 261. 
23 This census is based on the Law on Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013, Official Gazette of BiH, 10/12 and 18/13). 
24 Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova 
u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2013. Rezultati popisa/ Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013. Final results, Sarajevo, 2016, pp. 68-81, http://www.popis2013.ba 
/popis2013/doc/Popis2013prvoIzdanje.pdf (last accessed 17 September 2016). 
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systems and unique practices, with or without specific doctrinal 
knowledge. It remains that religion is always a social phenomenon 
manifesting at different levels, from individual to community. Religion is 
perceived as a faith-based community with its doctrinal teachings, moral 
norms, symbols, and rituals. Besides, religion implies the level of 
institutions, as relevant bodies that include leadership and specific types of 
hierarchy. 
In this sense, it may be said that the life of the majority of BiH citizens 
is overwhelmed by ethnic-religious modes, and their worldview channelled 
in ethnic-religious terms. The institutional and political milieu, in turn, is 
fully aware of this social situation. So, if a religious doctrine – that is norms, 
values and practices of a given confession – is the soil in which the ethnic 
differences are embedded, then religion appears as one of the most 
important sources of legitimization in politics. This also explains why in the 
experience of BiH, denominations and religious leaders are playing an 
important role in terms of transitional justice. Many people still vividly 
remember religious leaders’ ambivalent role during the war. However, if a 
majority of members of religious groups are struggling with past and 
present injustices, their respective leaders have a moral obligation to 
provide a forum for the public articulation of needs25; a forum that can serve 
both members of a religious group and, in order to establish a peaceful 
coexistence within the Country, non-members26. 
From the juridical point of view, all this leads to focus the attention 
on the way BiH’s law system regulates the relationship between the State 
and confessions, which implies the legal status of Churches and religious 
communities, starting from the major ones.  
These issues have been addressed by the legal reasoning of the 
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Annex IV of DPA)27. And, to this respect, it should be first noted that, 
although most of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH 
are devoted to institutional architecture, Part II of this Charter does not fall 
under that category. It is in effect dedicated to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which include the obligation of the Federation to 
ensure the highest level of internationally recognized standards in this 
                                                          
25 D. PHILPOTT, What Religion Brings to the Politics of Transitional Justice, in Journal of 
International Affairs , Fall/Winter, 2007. 61:1, pp. 93-110, see in particular p. 101. 
26 J.N. CLARK, Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors 
Doing Enough?, in Europe-Asia Studies, 62:4, pp. 671-694. 
27 D. ABAZOVIĆ, Reconciliation, cit., p. 36. 
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field28. It means, for example, that rights and freedoms that the Federation 
shall ensure are those set out by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security of 
person, the right to property, the right to education, the right to freedom of 
expression, the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the rights to the freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.  
In addition, BiH’s Constitution explicitly contains a non-
discrimination clause, which secures the equal treatment of all people, 
irrespective of their “sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status”29. It is important to underscore that the 
content of this clause is also reflected into the provisions of the 2003 Law on 
the Protection of National Minorities30, which not for nothing has been 
published in Official Gazette of BiH31 in three official languages; so that the 
Law is available not only to all public institutions, but also to other users, 
such as media and academics. In particular, the Law has been translated 
into English and Romany languages32, and its copies printed and 
distributed to various addresses. No authority in BiH has thus justification 
or excuse for any failure to be informed about its content33. 
                                                          
28 Article 2 of the Constitution. 
29 Article 4 of the Constitution. 
30 This Law was passed and came into effect in May 2003. 
31 No. 12/03. 
32 That is the first translation of a law into the Romany language in BiH is deemed 
extremely important for the emancipation of the Roma national minority in BiH and 
considered an example of positive affirmation of Roma 
33 In late 2003 the entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of BiH) began activities to enact their own laws on the rights of national 
minorities, as required by the Law on the Protection of National Minorities at the state 
level. The Law on Amendments to the Law on the Protection of National Minorities 
adopted in October 2005 (Official Gazette of BiH no. 76/2005) was more specific and set a 
statutory deadline of 60 days of the date of enactment of this Law for the establishment of 
the Council for National Minorities within the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Finally, a 
decision establishing the Council for National Minorities within the Parliamentary 
Assembly of BiH was adopted and published in May 2006 (Official Gazette of BiH no. 
38/2006), according to which the advisory body was established for the purpose of raising 
awareness about the importance of the establishment of the body for promoting and 
protecting rights and resolving outstanding issues of both all national minorities and Roma 
in particular as the largest and most vulnerable minority in our country. On 27 September 
2005 the Roma Board within the Council of Ministers issued a conclusion to publish the 
strategy in a booklet in official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbian, Bosnian and 
Croatian) and to translate and publish it in English and Romani. The expansion of network 
of non-governmental organizations of national minorities, particularly of Roma, and their 
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As can easily be seen, these provisions are theoretically fully in line 
with the basic principles of a constitutional democracy. Yet in BiH their 
execution is highly problematic, as demonstrated by BiH’s institutional 
architecture, which is based on power-sharing mechanisms affirming the 
equal representation of the constituent ethnic-national components. And, 
once again, it is important to stress that these components correspond to 
major religious denominations (the Islamic community, the Roman 
Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox Church). 
 
 
4 - The Constituent (Chosen) People and Religious Power-Sharing 
Mechanism 
 
In the Preamble of the Constitution, Bosnians, Croats and Serbs are 
described as “constituent peoples”, whose political representation reflects 
almost perfectly the composition of both the House of Peoples (the second 
chamber of the State Parliament) and the House of Representatives: the first 
is composed of five Bosnians and the same number of Croats from the 
Federation of BiH and five Serbs from the Republika Srpska, while a 
minimum number of 4 representatives of one constituent people shall be 
represented in the House of Representatives34. In addition, there is the 
Presidency (the collective Head of State) composed by three members with 
a Bosnian and a Croat from the Federation of BiH and a Serb from the 
Republika Srpska. It follows that only persons declaring affiliation with a 
constituent people are entitled to run for the House of Peoples and the 
Presidency.  
                                                          
networking continues at the level of BiH. In this sense, the implementation of The Action 
Plan on the Educational Needs of Roma and Other National Minorities in BiH has been 
intensified. There has been a rise in the number of Roma children and children of other 
ethnic minorities enrolled in schools at all levels of education in the Country. Depending 
on the capabilities of municipalities, cantons and the entities they were given school 
supplies, textbooks and monetary aid for transportation and meals. See Ministry for 
Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, Answers to he questionnaire on the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Cerd), 16 July 2014, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/AdHoc/5thsession/Bosnia_Herz.pdf (last 
accessed 17 September 2016). See also Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
the United Nations Office at Geneva, Information on the implementation of UN Resolution 
Named: “promoting human rights and fundamental freedom through a better understanding of 
tradition values of humankind”: The best examples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 February 2013, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRValues/BosniaHerzegovina.pdf.  
34 The House of Representatives shall consist of ninety-eight delegates. 
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In other words, these institutions only include people from three 
ethnicities, factually excluding and discriminating against the group of 
‘Others’, as expressly defined by the Preamble of the Constitution (Bosniacs, 
Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples, along with Others …). It means that, 
despite being citizens of BiH, a person may be denied any right to stand for 
election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency on the grounds of 
his/her ethnic-religious belonging. And we should not forget that the 
Constitution specifically provides that no legislation can be adopted 
without the approval of both the House of Peoples and the House of 
Representatives35. 
For these reasons, in 2009 the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that BiH’s power-sharing mechanism is not 
capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic State, 
built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures and 
religions. This is due to the fact that the power-sharing mechanism allows 
unequal treatment, which is based exclusively on a person’s ethnic-
religious origin. As a result, BiH’s constitutional provisions, which render 
a person ineligible for election because of his/her belonging, must be 
considered discriminatory and a breach of the ECHR’s provisions36. In 
Particular, they are in contrast with Article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction 
with Articles 3 of Protocol no. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 12, in the light 
of which free elections are those held under two basic conditions:  
- the free expression of the opinion of the people;  
- the right to elect and stand for election shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status37.  
It is important to underscore that the constitutional provisions regulating 
the power-sharing mechanism were not included in the Agreed Basic 
Principles that constituted the first outline for what the future Dayton 
                                                          
35 Article 17 of the Constitution. 
36 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications nos. 
27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009. 
37 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cit. See S. 
BARDUTZKY, The Strasbourg Court on the Dayton Constitution, in European Constitutional 
Law Review, 2010, 6:2, pp. 309-333; M. MILANOVIC, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in American Journal of International Law, 2010, 104, pp. 1-12; L. CLARIDGE, 
Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina in Minority rights group international, 12 march 2010, 
http://minorityrights.org/publications/discrimination-and-political-participation-in-bosnia-and-he 
rzegovina-march-2010/ (last accessed 17 September 2016). 
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Agreement would contain38. Moreover, the international mediators 
reluctantly accepted these arrangements at a later stage because of strong 
demands to this effect from some of the parties to the conflict39. When these 
constitutional provisions were put in place, a very fragile ceasefire was on 
the ground. The provisions were thus designed to end a brutal war marked 
by genocide and ethnic-religious cleansing.  
The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the 
constituent peoples – Bosnians, Croats and Serbs – was necessary to ensure 
peace. This explains the absence of representatives of the other communities 
at the peace negotiations and the participants’ preoccupation with effective 
equality between the constituent peoples in the post-conflict society40. 
But this also explains the importance of the 2009 ECtHR’s decision, 
capable of highlighting two conflicting aims of BiH’s peace process in 
general and the Dayton Agreement in particular. On the one hand, the 
tripartite structure of that mechanism was and is necessary to establish and 
maintain peace within the Country; which highlights the fact that religion 
and religious communities still remain as powerful sources for 
reconciliation, giving meaning, identity and spiritual strength to believers 
and bring people together around common causes in local communities41. 
                                                          
38 See paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of the Further Agreed Basic Principles of 26 September 
1995. 
39 G. NYSTUEN, Achieving Peace or Protecting Human Rights? Conflicts between Norms 
Regarding Ethnic Discrimination in the Dayton Peace Agreement, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden, 2005, p. 192. See also J. O’BRIEN, The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia: Durable Cease-
Fire, Permanent Negotiation, in Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking 
Outcomes, ed. by I. Zartman, V. Kremenyuk, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 105. 
40 Nevertheless, fully aware that these arrangements were most probably conflicting 
with human rights, the international mediators considered it to be especially important to 
make the Constitution a dynamic instrument and provide for their possible phasing out. 
Article 2 of Part II of the Constitution was therefore inserted establishing that the rights 
and freedoms set forth in the ECHR and its Protocols shall apply directly in BiH. Moreover, 
these rights and freedoms shall have priority over all other law. For example, the House of 
Peoples, together with the House of Representatives, decides upon the sources and 
amounts of revenues for the operations of the State institutions and international 
obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and approves a budget of the State institutions. 
41 To this respect, it should be noted that since 1997 in BIH there is the Interreligious 
Council of BiH, which contributes to truth and reconciliation as well as to linking of 
diversities with the aim of living together, respecting each other and cooperating. 
It is no coincidence that the Council has printed the Glossary of Religious Terms, in order 
to promote better understanding of the cultural diversity of society of BiH. At the same 
time, the Council has condemned any violence against all human being, “because any 
human rights violation is a violation of God’s laws”. Its goal is in other words to promote 
dialogue and cooperation between BiH’s religious communities in order to build a multi-
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On the other hand, based on the major ethnic-religious components, that 
tripartite structure is in contrast with the basic elements of a constitutional 
democracy, by which BiH claims to be inspired. 
 
 
5 - The Education System and Religious Education  
 
In this respect, it should be recalled what the 2004 Law on Freedom of 
Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in BiH 
(hereinafter the Law on Freedom of Religion)42 affirms in its Article 4.1:  
 
“Churches and religious communities shall not, when teaching 
religion or in other actions, disseminate hatred and prejudices against 
any other Churches and religious communities or its members, or 
against the citizens of no religious affiliation, or prevent their freedom 
to manifest in public their religion or belief”.43  
 
This provision must be read in conjunction with the 2003 framework laws, 
namely the Law on Preschool Upbringing and Education in BiH (FPUE)44 
and the Law on Elementary and Secondary School Education in BiH 
(FESSE)45, which were approved by the State in order to ensure compliance 
with minimum standards of human rights, including the prohibition of 
discrimination.  
Concerning the FPUE, it does not refer expressly to religious 
education at preschool level. It nonetheless affirms that the preschool 
upbringing and education must be conducted without any discrimination, 
                                                          
ethnic and multi-religious democratic society. To this end, the Interreligious Council works 
with local leaders of BiH’s major religions and members to build awareness of each other’s 
beliefs, customs, and practices and to foster joint activities at the local level. In particular, 
the Council works directly with local community leaders, theology students, women, and 
young people to raise awareness and promote constructive interreligious dialogue. During 
the last years, the Council has: organized several meetings for theological students from all 
faiths; assisted women believers to organize community activities; organized activities for 
young people to learn about different religious customs and traditions.  
42 Official Gazette of BiH, no. 5/04, ZAKONO SLOBODI VJERE I PRAVNOM 
POLOŽAJU CRKAVA I VJERSKIH ZAJEDNICA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI. 
43 On educational system in BiH see J. WOELK, Freedom of Religion in the Educational 
System of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in N. Ademović et alii, Freedom of Religion and Inter-
Religious Dialogue: Individual-Community-State. Scientific Study: Doctrinal and Practical 
Aspects of the Relationship between the State, Churches/Religous Communities and Individuals, 
Skenderija-Sarajevo, Evropska akademija za primijenjena istraživanja i obrazovanje u 
Bosni i Hercegovini, 2012, pp. 67-88.  
44 Official Gazette of BiH no. 88/07. 
45 Official Gazette of BiH No. 16/03. 
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taking into serious account the generally accepted universal values of a 
constitutional democracy46. In addition, the FPUE remarks the importance 
of the value systems concerning ethnic, historical, cultural and religious 
tradition of the peoples who live in the Country47. In particular, languages 
and cultures of all constituent peoples of BiH shall be respected and 
included in the preschool institution in accordance with the Constitution, 
the ECHR, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child48. In brief, the 
preschool institutions shall develop, promote and respect ethnic and 
religious freedoms, customs, tolerance and culture of dialogue49.  
Likewise, the FESSE states the obligation to enhance and protect 
religious freedoms, tolerance and culture of dialogue, the prohibition of 
undertaking any measures or activities to limit the freedom of expressing 
one’s own beliefs and of receiving knowledge about different religious 
beliefs. It also affirms the possibility of introducing religious classes for 
children, in accordance with their beliefs or their parents’ beliefs50. 
More generally, in BiH religious education is largely decentralized 
and it falls under the competence of the Cantons. Public schools offer 
religious education classes in the municipality’s majority religion, with 
some exceptions granted. The representative of the various religious 
communities must be responsible for teaching religious studies in all public 
and private preschools, primary schools, and universities. Individuals 
teaching religious education are employees of the schools in which they 
work; they however receive accreditation from the religious body, which in 
fact governs the curriculum. Normally, students have the right to opt out of 
religion classes, as do primary school students at their parents’ request. 
When a sufficient number of students of a minority religious group attend 
a particular primary or secondary school (i.e. 20 in the Republika Srpska 
and 15 in the Federation of BiH), the school is required to organize religion 
classes on their behalf. In rural areas, though, qualified religious 
representatives are typically not available to teach minority religion 
courses.  
                                                          
46 Article 6 of the FPUE. 
47 Article 8 of the FPUE. 
48 Article 10 of the FPUE. 
49 Article 11 of the FPUE. 
50 Article 9 of the FESSE. Besides, the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion gives also the 
possibility of establishing private schools, from preschool to secondary level of education, 
stating the equality of these schools with public schools. See Article 29 and Article 10 of the 
Law on Freedom of Religion 
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In the Federation’s five Bosnian-majority cantons, primary and 
secondary schools offer Islamic religious instruction as a twice-weekly 
elective class. In cantons with Croat majorities, Croat students attend an 
elective once weekly Catholic religion class in primary and middle schools. 
But, in 13 Croat-majority primary and secondary Catholic schools in the 
Federation, parents can choose between the elective Catholic religion class 
and a course in ethics.  
As far as the Sarajevo Canton is concerned, religious education is 
regulated by three Cantonal laws: the Law on Preschool Upbringing and 
Education51, the Law on Primary Upbringing and Education52, and the Law 
on Secondary Upbringing and Education53. Schools shall secure conditions 
for students to either attend religious education classes or take classes in 
ethics, whose curricula are passed by the Cantonal Ministry. At the 
beginning of each school year, with the consent of their parents, students 
choose one of the aforementioned classes. They can change the choice at the 
beginning of each school year. Marks obtained by a student in these kinds 
of classes shall be included in the calculation of the student’s average mark. 
Yet, on 22 April 2001 the Minister of Education and Science of the Sarajevo 
Canton passed a decision establishing that marks obtained for religious 
education should not be included in the calculation of the average mark54. 
 
 
6 - The Legal Status of Churches and the State-Religions Relationship 
 
Some parts of BiH’s legal system point in the direction of upholding the 
principle of secularism, in the strict sense of the word, like that promoted 
by the French laïcité. This is the case of Article 14 of the Law on the Freedom 
of Religion, which declares that the State may not accord the status of 
established Church to any religious community55, nor it has the right to 
interfere in the affairs and internal organization of Churches and religious 
communities56. On the contrary, when reading other parts of the same legal 
system, the later conclusion cannot endure a test of generalisation. This is 
                                                          
51 Official Gazette of the Sarajevo Canton nos. 26/08 and 21/09. 
52 Official Gazette of the Sarajevo Canton nos. 10/04, 21/06, 26/08 and 31/11. 
53 Official Gazette of the Sarajevo Canton no. 23/10. 
54 See J. WOELK, N. ADEMOVIĆ, General about Secularism and the Relationship between 
the State and Religious Communities, in N. Ademović et alii, Freedom of Religion, cit., pp. 23-
24. 
55 Article 14.1 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion. 
56 Article 14.2 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion. 
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the case of rules regulating education, which are profoundly influenced by 
religious organizations, especially the major ones.  
It is sufficient to mention the Preamble of the Constitution or Article 
4 of the Law on the Freedom of Religion which affirms the right of Churches 
and religious communities to religious education, provided solely by 
persons appointed to do so by a religious official body. At the same time, 
though, both the Constitution and the 2004 Law guarantee the right of all to 
freedom of conscience and religion in conformity with the highest 
international standards of human rights, including those referring to the 
supranational Declarations and Conventions, being an integral part of the 
Country’s law57.  
More specifically, the 2004 Law guarantees freedom of religion and 
belief in public and private58, enforces equality before the law and forbids 
discriminations based on religion and religious belonging59. Here is one of 
the reasons why it states that any group of 300 or more adult citizens may 
apply to form a new Church or religious community through a written 
application to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry must issue a decision 
within 30 days of receipt of the application, and a group may appeal a 
negative decision to the State-level Council of Ministers60. This Law, 
therefore, allows minority religious organizations to register and operate 
potentially without restrictions: new churches and religious communities 
acquire the status of legal person in the way prescribed in details by the 
Guidelines on Rulebook on Establishing and Keeping the Uniform Register 
of Churches and Religious Communities, their Unions and Organizational 
Forms in BiH61. But, once again, these provisions must be read in 
conjunction with other religious-oriented rules, such as those related to 
Article 15 of the Law on Freedom of Religion, which establishes that  
 
                                                          
57 Article 1 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion. 
58 Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion. 
59 Articles 2.1 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion: “[d]iscrimination on the grounds 
of religion or belief means any exclusion, restriction, preferential treatment, omission or 
any other form of differentiation on the grounds of religion or belief having for its purpose 
or which may bring about - directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally - the 
revocation or diminution of the recognition, equal enjoyment and exercise of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in civil, political, economic, social and cultural matters”. See 
also Article 5.1: “[a]ll discrimination based upon religion or belief as defined in Art. 2.1. of 
this Law is prohibited”. 
60 Article 15.1 of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion. 
61 PRAVILNIK O USPOSTAVI I VOĐENJU JEDINSTVENOG REGISTRA ZA UPIS 
CRKAVA I VJERSKIH ZAJEDNICA, NJIHOVIH SAVEZA I ORGANIZACIONIH OBLIKA U 
BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI - Official Gazette of BiH, no. 46/04. 
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“[t]he matters of common interest for Bosnia and Herzegovina or some 
or more Churches and religious communities can be governed by an 
agreement made between the BiH Presidency, the Council of 
Ministers, the governments of entities and Churches or religious 
communities”.  
 
In other words, this Article legitimizes the bilateralism method, through 
which issues concerning religious denominations are essentially regulated 
by legislations based on agreements between the State and specific 
confessions. In this manner, religious denominations that have signed an 
agreement have the guarantee that their legal status cannot be altered 
without considering their will62.  
It is no coincidence that the major religious groups of BiH intensely 
support that method, also because it is a part of a legal strategy aiming to 
preserve their special status and privileges within the State. The other parts 
of this strategy is based on political, historical and social discourse that, as 
seen before, tend to underscore the traditional connection between some 
areas of BiH and specific creeds (Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church).  
The best example of that is given by the 19 April 2006 Basic 
Agreement Between the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter 
the 2006 BA) that, as stated in the Preamble, recognises “the centuries-old 
presence of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of her 
current role in social, cultural and educational fields”63. Based on Article 15 
of the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion, one of the main characteristics of 
the 2006 BA is that it has the status of international agreement. So, the BA 
guarantees more rights to the Catholic Church than those normally 
prescribed by BiH’s general laws. It is no coincidence that similar 
agreements exist with both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic 
Community64.  
                                                          
62 G. CIMBALO, Religione e diritti umani nelle società in transizione dell'Est Europa, in 
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), February 2009, 
pp. 19-22. 
63 See Acta Apostolicae Sedis. Commentarium Officiale, 3 Novembris 2007, n. 11, pp. 939-
946, http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/2007/novembre%202007.pdf (last accessed 18 
September 2016).  
64 The Agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church was signed in 2007 and ratified 
in 2008, but the Government has not establishe d a commission for its implementation. The 
Islamic Community was the third organization in BIH that started (March 2008) 
negotiating this similar type of agreement with the Bosnian State: the Council of Ministers 
of BiH adopted the Agreement in September 2015, but it has not been signed yet. See 
United States, Department Bureau of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
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Article 8 of the 2006 BA, for instance, states that, in the case of a 
judicial inquiry into alleged offences against the penal code on the part of a 
cleric (a religious man or woman), the judicial authorities of BiH will inform 
the competent ecclesiastical authorities; in any circumstance, the seal of 
Confession is inviolable.  
Likewise, under the 2006 BA BiH not only recognizes the public 
juridical personality of the Catholic Church and all ecclesiastical 
institutions65, but it also undertakes to restore to the Church all real estate 
nationalized or seized without adequate compensation. This must be done 
within ten years from the entry into effect of the Agreement; for the 
properties that cannot be restored, BiH will give just compensation, to be 
agreed upon by the authorities and those with legitimate title to the 
properties66. 
Concerning education, in the light of the principle of freedom of 
religion, BiH recognizes the fundamental right of parents to see to the 
religious education of their children guaranteeing (within the framework of 
the academic programme and in conformity with the wishes of parents or 
guardians) the teaching of the Catholic religion in all public schools. 
Although teachers of religious education are full members of the teaching 
staff of the State’s institutions, the programmes, the content, the text-books 
must be issued and approved by the Episcopal Conference of BiH67.  
Finally, the Catholic Church has the right to establish its own 
educational institutions at all levels and to administer them according to its 
norms. To this respect, BiH will accord to such institutions the same rights 
                                                          
Labor, 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19 September 
2008, http://www.refworld.org/docid/48d5cbd52.html (last accessed 2 November 2016). See also 
United States, Department Bureau of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor, 2011 Report on International Religious Freedom - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/193003.pdf (last accessed 2 November 2016); 
ICAAM YKPAÏHI, Bosnian Muslims Are the Unique Slavic Ethnic Linguistic Group, Practicing 
Islam, http://islam.in.ua/en/islamic-studies/bosnian-muslims-are-unique-slavic-ethnic-linguistic-
group-practicing-islam, 27 July 2016 (last accessed 2 November 2016). 
65 Institutions that possess such juridical personality in conformity with the norms of 
canon law. Article 2 of the 2006 BA. 
66 Article 10 of the 2006 BA: “[t]he restitution of immoveable or nationalized goods 
seized without adequate compensation, including the term of their restitution, will be 
implemented in conformity with the law that shall regulate the matter of restitution in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the identification of immoveable goods to be transferred to 
ecclesiastical ownership or to be adequately compensated, a Mixed Commission will be 
established, composed of representatives of the two parties” (Additional Protocol to the 
2006 BA). 
67 Article 16 of the 2006 BA. 
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that are guaranteed to public schools, including financial treatment and the 
recognition of academic degrees and any university qualifications obtained. 
In sum, BiH’s authorities will guarantee to the pupils and students of the 
Catholic Church’s educational institutions the same rights of pupils and 
students of State institutions of the equivalent level68. 
 
 
7 - Conclusion  
 
Before the 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion entered into force, BiH’s Courts 
of the first and second instance dismissed an appellant’s request, claiming 
that her former husband had owed her a mahr/dowry, a type of 
compensation payable in the event of dissolution of a Shari’a marriage: the 
marriage had been celebrated under the Islamic precepts and not under the 
State’s family law69 which, in any case, contained no reference to the dowry, 
the Courts declared. The Constitutional Court of BiH went further saying 
that the claim of the appellant was ill founded, as she had not acquired 
“possession” within the meaning of the ECHR70: the mahr property-related 
mechanism was unknown in the positive legal regulations in BiH, the 
Judges stated71.  
In this occasion, though, the Constitutional Court also pointed out 
that the State and its judicial authorities have no right to interfere with 
autonomous rights of religious communities, such as those related to 
arrangement of religious marriages and rights and obligations stemming 
from such marriages. In doing so, the Court made clear that this is a result 
of the principle of separation between the State and Churches/religious 
communities72; a principle that few years later (2004) was expressly 
affirmed in Article 14 of the Law on Freedom of Religion73.  
However, one should not underestimate the fact that the 2004 Law 
confirms the continuity of legal personality of the “historically based 
churches and religious communities” (namely the Islamic Community, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Jewish 
                                                          
68 The same rule also applies to the teaching and non-teaching staff of such institutes. 
Article 14 of the 2006 BA. 
69 Official Gazette of BiH, nos. 21/73 and 44/89. 
70 In particular Article 1 Protocol no. 1 ECHR.  
71 Constitutional Court of BiH, case no. U 62/01 of 5 April 2002. 
72 Constitutional Court of BiH, case no. U 62/01 of 5 April 2002. 
73 Supra, para. 6. 
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Community of BiH)74. And there is more: Article 2.1 of the same Law states 
that  
 
“making of distinctions or preferences by Churches and religious 
communities when the State judge it necessary to comply with 
religious obligations or needs shall not be considered as discrimination on 
the grounds of religion or belief” (emphasis added).75  
 
As one might expect, these provisions can be fully justified and understood 
under the role and influence exercised by major religions in BiH. And, as 
said before, we should not forget that religions remain important political 
and legal points of reference within the Country. This, one again, 
underscores a specific characteristic of BiH’s legal system, especially when 
related to religion and religious creeds. 
If you simply read some provisions of that system, you would 
visualize its institutional design as a form of contemporary secular 
liberalism76. If, on the contrary, the attention is focused on the other 
provisions, you would see a different attitude. This is an attitude of a more 
traditional, group-oriented society, in which individuals communicate with 
the State through their membership in an ethnic-religious community. As a 
result, in BIH’s legal system we find a co-mixture of different voices, which 
we have to comprehend if we are to appreciate and understand the current 
challenges and future scenarios in a Country whose stability, reconciliation 
and development are crucial for the destiny of the Balkan region, if not of 
all Europe.  
 
 
                                                          
74 Article 8. 
75 Article 2.1. 
76 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH No. U 5/98-IV, 18-19 August 2000. 
In the Constitution of BiH no explicit rule about secularism can be found. Nevertheless, the 
Constitutional Court of BiH pointed out that any public privileging of Churches and/or 
religious communities by public authorities must not lead to the marginalisation of 
freedom of religion. In addition, it is particularly important to take into account the sense 
of pluralism, which is required both by the European Convention of Human Right and the 
Constitution of BiH, as a necessary precondition for a constitutional democracy.  
